

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ADDIS 00221 01 OF 02 141154Z
ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-07 ISO-00 AF-04 NSC-06 NSCE-00 /021 W
-----141158Z 041223 /11

R 140548Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2313

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ADDIS ABABA 0221

LIMDIS

NOFORN

FOR AF/E

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OREP (RICHARDSON, WILLIAM)
SUBJ: STAFFDEL RICHARDSON

FOLLOWING MEMCON RICHARDSON VISIT --CONVERSATION WITH TFAI
HIGH COMMISSIONER DEC 18, 1976

QUOTE:

PARTICIPANTS: CAMILLE D'ORNANO--TFAI HIGH COMMISSIONER;
WILLIAM RICHARDSON--SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF
COMMANDANT BELLEC--BUREAU DES ETUDES, OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER;
LOUIS JANOWSKI--AMERICAN EMBASSY, ADDIS ABABA

PLACE AND DATE: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S RESIDENCE, DJIBOUTI,
TFAI, DECEMBER 18, 1976

LANGUAGE: FRENCH

SUBJ: RICHARDSON VISIT--CONVERSATION WITH TFAI HIGH COMMISSIONER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ADDIS 00221 01 OF 02 141154Z

AFTER INTRODUCTIONS AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE PURPOSE OF RICHARD-
SON'S VISIT, RICHARDSON ASKED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER TO EVALUATE
THE RELATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS OF TFAI COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
PRESIDENT ABDALLAH KAMIL. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER NOTED THAT

KAMIL'S GOVERNMENT WAS ONE OF TRANSITION. HE THEN OUTLINED THE STEPS THAT WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE TFAI DURING THE PERIOD PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE. MR. RICHARDSON THEN ASKED FOR D'ORNANO'S VIEWS ON THE NATIONALITY QUESTION AND THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM. D'ORNANO REPLIED THAT NO REAL PROBLEM EXISTED, THAT IT WAS A FALSE PROBLEM, PERCEIVED ONLY BY OUTSIDERS. THE PROBLEMS OF THE TFAI WERE NOT PROBLEMS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES. HE STATED THE POPULATION OF THE TFAI WAS 235,000 WITH 135,000 AS THE POPULATION OF DJIBOUTI PROPER.

IN RESPONSE TO RICHARDSON'S QUESTION ON ETHIO-SOMALI INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE TERRITORY, D'ORNANO NOTED THAT IN HIS 10 MONTHS AS HIGH COMMISSIONER, THERE HAD BEEN NO GENERAL INCIDENTS. THE POLICY OF THE GOF AND THE PRESENT TFAI GOVERNMENT WAS TO UNITE ALL FACTIONS WITHIN THE TERRITORY AND TO SEEK GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA. THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WAS NO PRO-SOMALIA, ALTHOUGH THE FORMER GOVERNMENT OF ALI AREF COULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS ANTI-SOMALI. HE NOTED THE RECENT REMOVAL OF FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE SOMALI COAST (FLCS) LEADERSHIP AS AN EXAMPLE OF POSITIVE SOMALI POLICY AND EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT THE SOMALIS WERE UNLIKELY TO COMMIT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE TERRITORY.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER STATED IT WAS NECESSARY TO TAKE A REALISTIC VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE TERRITORY. ETHIOPIA HAD VITAL INTERESTS TO PROTECT (PORT, RAILROAD, ACCESS TO THE SEA), AND NO ONE IN THE TFAI DISPUTED THE LEGITIMACY OF THESE INTERESTS. THE FRENCH AND THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WISHED TO PRESERVE AND PROTECT THESE INTERESTS. HOWEVER, WHEN "THE EPMG SPEAKS TO THIS GOVERNMENT AND TO THE AFRICAN POPULAR LEAGUE FOR INDEPENDENCE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ADDIS 00221 01 OF 02 141154Z

(LPAI), IT THINKS OF THEM AS PRO-SOMALI AND CONTINUALLY DEMANDS THAT THEY CONDEMN THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT." D'ORNANO ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT HASSAN GOULED, PRESIDENT OF THE LPAI, WAS ESSENTIALLY A DJIBOUTI NATIONALIST.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER NOTED THAT DJIBOUTI WAS NOT THE SOLE PROBLEM BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA, AND EXPRESSED HIS STRONG VIEW THAT THE EPMG SHOULD NOT LINK THE DJIBOUTI PROBLEM WITH THAT OF THE OGADEN. THE EPMG SHOULD INVITE THE TFAI LEADERSHIP TO ADDIS, A STEP HE HAD URGED THE EPMG TO TAKE FOR SOME TIME. HE HAD HELD UP PRESIDENT KAMIL'S VISIT TO MOGADISCIO FOR TWO MONTHS IN THE HOPE OF A PRIOR EPMG INVITATION TO KAMIL.

D'ORNANO INDICATED THAT THE EPMG WAS FOLLOWING A DIVISIVE POLICY TOWARDS THE TFAI WHICH WAS NOT IN ITS OWN BEST INTERESTS, THAT THE EPMG WAS VOLUNTARILY DIGGING A DITCH IN WHICH TO BURY ITSELF. HE HOPED THAT THE EPMG WAS NOT SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST TFAI. HE REVIEWED TFAI GOVERNMENT ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA, NOTING THAT BOTH THE

PORT AND RAILROAD WERE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY. CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROAD TO THE ETHIOPIAN BORDER WAS NEARING COMPLETION, WHILE THE ROAD TO LOYODA AND SOMALIA REMAINED CLOSED. HE STATED THAT IF ANYONE HAD A RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AT THIS TIME IT WAS THE GSDR, AND DESPITE THIS, THE EPMG CONTINUED TO ACCUSE THE GOF AND THE GSDR OF COLLABORATING TO THE DETRIMENT OF ETHIOPIA.

RICHARDSON ASKED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ABOUT THE DEGREE OF STABILITY OF THE PRESENT LPAI-PARLIAMENTARY COALITION. D'ORNANO INDICATED THAT IT WAS QUITE GOOD AT PRESENT, NOTING THAT THE COALITION HAS CRYSTALIZED OUT OF OPPOSITION TO FORMER PRESIDENT ALI AREF. ON THE EXTENT OF SOMALI INFLUENCE OVER THE LPAI, D'ORNANO INDICATED THE LPAI WAS NOT ENTIRELY WITH SOMALIA AND THAT THE GSDR COULD NOT COUNT ON ITS UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT. THE HIGHCOMMISSIONER NOTED THAT THE SOMALI-LPAI ALLIANCE HAD COALISCED AS A RESULT OF THE EARLIER ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE FRENCH, ETHIOPIA, AND ALI AREF. WITH THE FALL OF THIS LATTER ALIANCE, THE LPAI-SOMALI
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 ADDIS 00221 01 OF 02 141154Z

ALLIANCE WAS NO LONGER AS NECESSARY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE LPAI REPRESENTED, AND HAD THE SUPPORT OF 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF THE CITY OF DJIBOUTI.

THE CITY OF DJIBOUTI WAS TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT IN THE POLITICS OF THE TERRITORY. WITH ONLY 10 PERCENT OF ITS POPULATION BEING AFAR, ISSAS CONTROLLED THE CITY OF DJIBOUTI, WHICH IN EFFECT CONTROLLED THE TERRITORY. WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE GOF COULD NOT MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUOTE (I.E., ALI AREF AND AFAR DOMINATION), BECAUSE OF SOMALI AND LPAI PRESSURE, ALI AREF FELL. HE HAD ALIENATED ALL POLITICAL GROUPS WITHIN THE TERRITORY AND WHEN IT WAS CLEAR HE NO LONGER HAD THE BACKING OF THE GOF HE WAS FINISHED. THE EPMG WAS UNHAPPY ABOUT THIS BECAUSE THE GOF NEVER CONSULTED WITH THE EPMG ON THIS MATTER.

ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN TERRITORY AFTER INDEPENDENCE, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER NOTED THAT ALI AREF HAD NO POLITICAL FUTURE, AND THAT THE TERRITORY WOULD NOT BE CONTROLLED BY ONE POLITICAL GROUP. HE NOTED THAT HE WOULD NOT OR COULD NOT MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE TERRITORY BY FORCE. DURING THE VISIT BY THE OAU FACT-FINDING TEAM, THE LPAI HAD BEEN ABLE TO PUT 10,000 PEOPLE IN THE STREETS. HE HAD NO INTENTION OF USING FRENCH FORCES TO MAINTAIN A "FASCIST" CONTROL OVER THE TERRITORY. THERE WERE NO SERIOUS PUBLIC SECURITY PROBLEMS AT PRESENT, BUT THE MAJOR FUTURE PROBLEM WOULD BE THE EPMG, AN "INVISIBLE" OR "UNREACHABLE" GOVERNMENT. BOTH THE USG AND THE GOF WOULD HAVE TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO CALM AND RESTRAIN THE EPMG.

RICHARDSON ASKED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER HOW THE USG COULD ASSIST IN A PEACEFUL MOVEMENT TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE. D'ORNANO INDICATED

THAT ANY USG MOVES WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBTLE. HE HAD ALWAYS ADVISED THE GOF THAT IT SHOULD NOT MAKE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE TERRITORY WITHOUT CONSULTING LOCAL LEADERSHIP. HOW THE US ATTEMPTED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WAS AS IMPORTANT AS WHAT WAS ACTUALLY DONE. USG EFFORTS SHOULD NOT BE VISIBLE, IN ORDER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 ADDIS 00221 01 OF 02 141154Z

NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT USG HAD INTENTIONS TOWARDS THE TERRITORY. THE USG SHOULD URGE THIRD COUNTRIES, SUCH AS EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA (WHICH WAS WELL THOUGHT OF BY THE LP AI), TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. DIRECT US CONTACT WITH THE LP AI AT THIS TIME WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. AT THE MOMENT OF INDEPENDENCE THE USG COULD OFFER ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, BUT ANY OFFER PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE WOULD ALSO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER STATED THAT AN INVITATION BY THE SAUDIS TO PRESIDENT KAMIL WOULD BE A MOST USEFUL STEP, AND WOULD BE READILY ACCEPTED. D'ORNANO ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL COULD BE ADDED TO THE LIST OF COUNTRIES WHICH COULD PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 ADDIS 00221 02 OF 02 141213Z
ACTION H-03

INFO OCT-01 SS-07 ISO-00 AF-04 NSC-06 NSCE-00 /021 W
-----141239Z 041414 /10

R 140548Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2317

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 ADDIS ABABA 0221

LIMDIS

NOFORN

FOR AF/E

D'ORNANO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE EPMG WAS DRIVING THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP INTO THE HANDS OF THE SOMALIS. THE EPMG WAS CAPABLE OF "LIGHTING A MATCH THAT WOULD BLOW UP THE TFAI" AND DESTROYING ALL HIS EFFORTS. THE EPMG WAS FINANCING AND CREATING INTERNAL

SUBVERSION IN THE TERRITORY. IT HAD TRAINED AND INFILTRATED COMMANDOS. IT FINANCED AND SUPPORTED THE POPULAR LIBERATION MOVEMENT (MPL), A SMALL GROUP OF YOUNG MAOIST AFARS, WHO WERE OPPOSED TO ALL EXISTING POLITICAL FACTIONS IN THE TERRITORY.

THE REPORTING OFFICER INDICATED TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER THE PRESENT STATUS OF US-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS AND THE EFFECTIVE DECLINE IN DAY-TO-DAY INFLUENCE ON THE EPMG SINCE THE REVOLUTION. THE USG HAD FEW CARDS TO PLAY, AND IT WOULD BE MOST IMPORTANT TO RESERVE THEM FOR APPROPRIATE AND IMPORTANT MOMENTS.

AS TO THE SOMALIS, D'ORNANO INDICATED THAT THEIR INTEREST LAY IN MAINTAINING THE PRESENT SITUATION. IN HIS VIEW, THEY HAD NOT GIVEN UP THEIR LONG TERM GOALS AND DESIGNS. HOWEVER, HIS PROBLEM WAS THE PRESENT, AND THE EPMG WAS ESTROYING TRANQUILITY AND CREATING ETHNIC DIVISIONS WITHIN THE TERRITORY BY EXCITING EXISTING AFAR/ISSA DIFFERENCES. WHAT THE EPMG HOPED TO DO WAS TO CREATE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ADDIS 00221 02 OF 02 141213Z

A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN THE TERRITORY THAT WOULD WORK TO ITS ADVANTAGE. IN HOPING TO CREATE A SITUATION WHICH WOULD ALLOW ALI AREF AND THE MPL TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN TERRITORIAL POLITICS, THE EPMG WAS PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE GSDR. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER NOTED THAT THE GSDR FOR ITS PART WAS RESTRAINING THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE SOMALI COAST (FLCS). PROOF COULD BE SEEN IN RECENT OUSTING OF FIVE FLCS LEADERS.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON SOVIET ACTIVITIES, D'ORNANO STATED HE HAD NO EVIDENCE OF SOCIET ACTIONS. THE SOVIETS HAD BACKED THE GSDR IN THE PAST, BUT AT PRESENT APPEARED TO BE DOING NOTHING.

RICHARDSON THEN ASKED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER ABOUT THE FUTURE GOF ROLE IN THE TERRITORY AND THE EXTENT OF DOMESTIC OPPOSITION IN FRANCE TO A CONTINUED GOF PRESENCE. D'ORNANO INDICATED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO A CONTINUED FRENCH PRESENCE AND "IF THERE WERE, IT WOULDN'T LAST FOR LONG, I CAN TELL YOU THAT". THE SOCIALISTS SUPPORTED THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY, AND ONLY THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD OBJECTIONS. THIRD WORLD NATIONS, OF COURSE, PUBLICLY ATTACKED THE FRENCH PRESENCE IN DJIBOUTI, BUT PRIVATELY PRESSED THE GOF TO REMAIN. IF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF DJIBOUTI ASKED FOR FRENCH MILITARY PRESENCE, IT WAS NOT ONLY A POSSIBILITY, BUT A CERTAINTY. FRENCH FORCES WERE NOW

TRAINING BOTH POLICE AND THE FUTURE TERRITORIAL ARMY. AT PRESENT, THE LOCAL POLICE CARRIED OUT INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS WITH THE GOF MILITARY PRESENCE PERFORMING SOLELY A DEFENSIVE ROLE. THE GOF'S POLICY WAS TO "AFRICANIZE" LOCAL SECURITY FORCES, AND A LOCAL FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 3,000 MEN WAS NOW

AVAILABLE.

THE REPORTING OFFICER NOTED PRESIDENT KAMIL'S STATEMENT THAT A LOCAL FORCE OF 6,000 MEN WOULD BE REQUIRED, AND RICHARDSON ASKED IF THERE WERE NOT A RISK OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING FRENCH FORCES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ADDIS 00221 02 OF 02 141213Z

AFTER INDEPENDENCE. THE HIGH COMMISSIONER QUICKLY OVERRULED BELLEC'S "OUT" AND STATED THE PROBLEM WAS PRIMARILY ONE OF ORGANIZATION. THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN STUDIED CAREFULLY, AND WHILE THE POSSIBILITY OF INCIDENTS WOULD EXIST, HE WAS CONFIDENT THE PROBLEM COULD BE MINIMIZED.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF CONSULAR PRESENCE BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE TERRITORY, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER INDICATED HE WAS NOT AGAINST SUCH PRESENCE IF THE NATIONS INVOLVED RESPECTED THE REALITY OF THE ROD'S FUTURE INDEPENDENCE. ASKED IF THIS VIEW EXTENDED TO A USG CONSULAR PRESENCE PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE, D'ORNANO REPLIED "YES, WHY NOT?" FOREIGN CONSULAR PRESENCE HELPED ASSURE THE LOCAL LEADERSHIP OF THE REALITY OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND COULD HELP FORESTALL EPMG AND GSDR ACTIONS.

RICHARDSON ASKED IF US AID TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT WAS DESIRABLE, AND THE HIGH COMMISSIONER REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, INDICATING THAT THE GOF WISHED NO MONOPOLY ON ASSISTANCE TO THE FUTURE STATE. THE LPAI WOULD BE OVERJOYED BY A SAUDI OFFER OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. HE INDICATED HIS VIEW THAT ANY US ASSISTANCE SHOULD NOT BE CONDITIONAL OR WITH STRINGS ATTACHED, AND THAT A MINIMUM OF PROPAGANDA SHOULD ACCOMPANY ANY US ASSISTANCE. ANY OTHER APPROACH WAS DOOMED TO FAILURE. THE PRESSING NEEDS OF THE TERRITORY WERE ROADS, R&D ON MARINE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STUDIES ON GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PORT.

RICHARDSON ASKED HIGH COMMISSIONER IF HE FELT HE WAS GETTING ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR HIS POLICIES FROM THE GOF AND SUFFICIENT ATTENTION FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOF. AFTER A LONG AND POINTED PAUSE, D'ORNANO REPLIED TO THE EFFECT THAT HE SUPPORTED THE GOF'S POLICIES, AND THE GOF SUPPORTED HIS POLICIES. IF THAT WERE NOT THE CASE, HE WOULD NO LONGER BE HIGH COMMISSIONER.

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER CLOSED BY NOTING HE WOULD BE GOING TO ADDIS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 ADDIS 00221 02 OF 02 141213Z

ON DECEMBER 20 FOR TAITINGER'S VISIT. THE EPMG HAD SPECIFICALLY

REQUESTED HIS PRESENCE, AND HE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN TO TASK BY THE EPMG FOR HIS POLICIES IN THE TFAI. HE AGREED TO HAVE BELLEC TRY TO SET UP APPOINTMENTS FOR RICHARDSON WITH A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, BUT CAUTIONED AGAINST ANY MEETINGS WITH ALI AREF. ANY SUCH MEETING WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO USG INTERESTS AND BE INTERPRETED LOCALLY AS USG SUPPORT FOR ALI AREF.

DURING THE CONVERSATION, D'ORNANO ALSO INDICATED THAT THE EPMG HAD CUT OFF SHIPMENTS OF VEGETABLES TO THE TERRITORY SEVERAL DAYS AGO. HE DID NOT STATE IF THIS HAD BEEN DONE FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES.

REPORTING OFFICER'S COMMENT:

THE REPORTING OFFICER HAD THE CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT SOME OF D'ORNANO'S STATEMENTS WENT BEYOND EXISTING GOF POLICY. D'ORNANO LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT WHILE HE AGREED WITH THE GENERAL LINES OF GOF POLICY, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SUFFICIENT ATTENTION WAS BEING PAID TO DJIBOUTI BY THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOF. D'ORNANO'S VIEWS SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO HIM, AND SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM DEPARTMENTAL RELEASE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

CLASSIFIED BY HERBERT S. MALI
GDS-DECLASSIFIED 12/31/85

DRAFTED LOUIS F. JANOWSKI:EL

UNQUOTE
TIENKEN

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 14-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977ADDIS00221
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EL
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770014-0832
Format: TEL
From: ADDIS ABABA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770153/aaaabtb.tel
Line Count: 363
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 72fe04da-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION H
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NOFORN, LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NOFORN, LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3601723
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: STAFFDEL RICHARDSON FOLLOWING MEMCON RICHARDSON VISIT --CONVERSATION WITH TFAI HIGH COMMISSIONER DEC 18, 1976
TAGS: OREP, (RICHARDSON, WILLIAM)
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/72fe04da-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009